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1 From  its  inception,  the  Frankfurt  School  was  sceptical  of  the  new  momentum
anthropological thought gained during the Weimar Republic. Although its members were
by and large committed to the idea of the human being’s permanent self-realization in
history, which led them to reject every doctrine of man’s invariant characteristics, they
nevertheless differed significantly on their willingness to integrate anthropological
assumptions into their individual work. Max Horkheimer, for instance, explicitly granted
philosophical anthropology an auxiliary role for Critical Theory in his essays from the
mid-1930s, and he relied heavily on contemporary ethnology and anthropology in the
first chapter of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, a relentless opponent of all shades of anthropological philosophy,
repeatedly  took  issue  with  Walter  Benjamin’s  “anthropological  materialism”,  and
dismissed  philosophical  anthropology  tout  court in  his  Negative  Dialectics.  Ulrich
Sonnemann,  a  friend  of  Adorno’s  and  one  of  the  last  representatives  of  the  first
generation,  published  his  main  work,  Negative  Anthropologie in  1969.  Providing
“preliminary  studies  on  the  sabotage  of  fate,”  as  the  subtitle  reads,  he  called  for  a
permanent revolution against  any total  theory of  man.  Beyond Sonnemann’s  specific
understanding, his notion of “negative anthropology” serves well to characterise Critical
Theory’s ambiguous altercations with anthropological philosophy.1
3 Despite their differences in detail, Horkheimer, Adorno and Sonnemann were unanimous
in their refusal to ask or answer the question “What is man?” – and indeed to make any
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positive  assumptions  about  the  essence  of  man.2 Broadly  conceived,  negative
anthropology rests on this abstention from judgment; it originates in Marx’s (1978: 145)
understanding of human essence as “the ensemble of the social relations”, but as part of a
critical  social  and cultural  theory  it  is  not  limited  to  ex  negativo determinations.  By
understanding the human being as the ensemble of what it is not, or what it failed to
make of itself, negative anthropology resists the demand of spelling out what man can or
should be,  while holding on to the possibility of  realising happiness and abandoning
suffering in history.3
4 The idea of permanent anthropogenesis salvaged by negative anthropology requires a ban
on any anthropological point of view that holds human essence fixed across historical
epochs.4 By and large, all representatives of the early Frankfurt School share this verdict.5
During the 1920s and 1930s, renewed interest in anthropology prompts Horkheimer and
Adorno  to  re-evaluate  the  status  and  legitimacy  of  anthropological  principles  and
assumptions. It is not until the late 1960s, however, that Sonnemann explicitly addresses
the relationship between Critical Theory and philosophical anthropology.
 
I. Horkheimer. The Critique of the Invariant
5 Horkheimer  was  highly  sceptical  of  theoretical  anthropology  and  certainly  never
proposed an identifiable or programmatic philosophical anthropology himself. However,
he dealt explicitly with anthropology in his “Remarks on Philosophical Anthropology”
from 1935. He argues that “Modern philosophical anthropology stems from precisely the
same need that  the idealist  philosophy of  the bourgeois  era tried to satisfy from its
inception: namely to lay down new, absolute principles that provide the rationale for
action” (1995:  153-154).  Horkheimer focuses  on the relation between anthropological
assumptions and the absolute principles that serve to legitimate forms of sovereignty. He
points  out  that  the  strength  and danger  of  philosophical  anthropology  lies  in  the
absoluteness  of  its  answers,  and  that  assumptions  about  man  as  such are  powerful
instruments for the constitution of society’s moral substance.
6 Horkheimer (1995: 156) takes issue with Max Scheler’s philosophical anthropology. He
worries that the concept of essence, or “Wesen”, that the phenomenological method tries
to determine,  implies the idea of  determination or destiny.  “The desire to provide a
foundation  for  action  by  way  of  insights  into  human  nature  (feste  Wesenheiten)  has
motivated phenomenology since its beginning.” The universality of things can never be
perfectly represented by their particular existence. Because existing particulars can be
classified and subsumed under concepts, they always refer to the possibility of a higher,
more complete reality (Marcuse 1936: 3). This idea of a general historical determination
of  man  implicit  in  the  concept  of  human  essence  is  what  Horkheimer  rejects.  The
discrepancy of what is and what should be is measured by the eidos of man’s possible
perfection implied by the concept of essence. 
7 Social  philosophy,  as  Horkheimer  understands  it,  has  to  oppose  such  teleological
determinations. Philosophical notions of man’s ideal condition are always determined by
the present social circumstances. Critical Theory, on the contrary, “does not provide the
grounds for meaning and an eternal purpose. […] A theory free from illusions can only
conceive of human purpose negatively, and reveals the inherent contradictions between
the conditions of existence and everything that the great philosophies have postulated as
a purpose” (Horkheimer 1995: 156-157).
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8 To speak only negatively about the human being means not to prescribe what it can or
should be, but to account for what it lacks under the prevailing social conditions. Possible
references  for  such  philosophical  work  include  deprivation,  economic  inequality,
hardship and the like, which can be empirically analysed in the past and present. Future
ideals like the idealist dictum of an absolute unfolding of the human being’s dispositions
can  only  serve  as  negative  references  that  reveal  the  defects  and  contradictions  of
society’s actual condition.
9 But there is not only hardship and misery. History also contains traces of liberation in the
revolutionary movements of the past. In the words of the early Marx, the human being
has not yet come into being, because to the present day its species characteristics – the
characteristics that result from the historical form of his conscious relation to nature by
means of labour – have been restricted by repressive forms of social organisation (Marx
1988:  75-77;  Bien  1984:  65-77,  201-217).  Horkheimer  is  not  willing  to  give  up  the
anthropological  assumptions  implied  by  this model  of  man’s  progressive  historical
realisation, for it allows him to justify a universal, trans-historical demand of the human
being to be liberated from repressive social conditions. 
10 However,  if  the external social  world that shapes the human being changes over the
course of history, there can be no undeviating, unified human essence. But only because
the concept of human essence cannot lend meaning to history, “Anthropological studies
[…] do not have to be worthless (wertlos); they can extend and refine the understanding of
historical tendencies. They would then be concerned with historically determined human
beings and groups of  human beings instead of  with man as such,  and would seek to
understand their existence and development not as isolated individuals but rather as
integral parts of the life of society” (1995: 161; transl. changed).
11 Horkheimer eventually grants anthropology some legitimacy, as he does not counter it
with absolute negativity. As a “reactive philosophical discipline” (Habermas 1973: 92),
philosophical anthropology cannot claim to be value-free, and Horkheimer (1995: 159)
sees  Scheler  aligning  with  Critical  Theory  on  this  point.  Because  the  human  being
universally  deserves  to  be  liberated  from suffering,  Horkheimer’s  (1995:  175;  transl.
changed)  negative  anthropology  cannot  be  entirely  negative:  “The  denial  of  an
unchanging,  constant  human nature  should,  on  the  other  hand,  not  be  taken as  an
absolute to the extent that the belief in a universal human nature appears at times as the
lesser of two evils. One must also recognise that happiness and misery run constantly
through  history;  that  human  beings  as  they  are  have  their  limits  and  deserve
consideration.” 
12 Not  unlike Benjamin,  Horkheimer allows for  a  minimum of  positive  anthropology in
order to mobilise the efforts of failed revolutions for the present. The determination of
man’s essence as deserving to be relieved from suffering, however, does not hold for
every  historical  epoch,  but  only  for  the  present  in  respect  to  the  development  of
bourgeois society – in respect to what Marx called the “prehistory of human society”
(Marx 1992: 426). If the concept of an unchangeable and unitary human essence were
abandoned entirely, man’s present right to freedom from repression would be negated as
well.
13 Over two decades later, in 1957, Horkheimer again picks up the “Concept of Man” as a
philosophical problem in his contribution to the Festschrift for Helmuth Plessner. Spelling
out the theoretical reflections of his “Remarks”, he discusses how the socio-economic
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changes in the fields of  education,  family,  technology,  labour conditions,  relations of
generation, sex and age groups affect the individual, and consequently the way in which
the  human being presents  itself  to  philosophical  inquiry.  Horkheimer’s  (1974:  14-15)
theoretical  position  compared  with  that  of  1935  seems  almost  unchanged.  A  “static
conception” of man is impossible because of the individual’s dependency on its social and
cultural circumstances. “For however much history may depend on individuals […], it
remains true that man’s makeup is itself a product of his history.” For Horkheimer, only
the “rational spontaneity of society”, which is the objectified critical subjectivity of the
individual itself, is capable of penetrating the veiled correlation between society and the
individual.  Critical  philosophy’s task is to gain precise knowledge of the irrational in
society, which is particularly important in view of any “naturalistic anthropology” that
propels the degeneration (Reprimitivierung) of human history back into natural history by
reinforcing the strength and power of those who are already economically the strongest.
14 To explain the way in which the human being can be studied in accordance with Critical
Theory, Horkheimer (1974: 27) quotes from Adorno’s “Sociology and Psychology” (1967:
77): “The isolated individual, the pure subject of self-preservation, embodies in absolute
opposition to society its  innermost principle.  The jarring elements that make up the
individual, his ‘properties’, are invariably also moments of the social totality. He is, in the
strict sense, a monad, representing the whole and its contradictions, without, however,
being at anytime conscious of the whole.” The “trait of anthropology, […] the constitution
of people as they in fact exist in our society” (Adorno 2003: 30) is the imprint society
leaves on the inner constitution of the isolated subject. The monadic subject is unable to
recognise the totality of which it is a part. However, the epoch’s social and economic laws
are  covertly  inscribed  in  its  inner  constitution,  and  this  structural  correspondence
between subject and world allows for sociology and psychology to consider the individual
as a seismograph for society’s development as a whole. But this is it. Horkheimer and
Adorno  agree  that  human  “essence”  is  nothing  but  the  distorted  and  unconscious
reflection of its social-historical circumstances.
15 Unlike  Adorno,  however,  Horkheimer  does  not  repudiate  philosophical  anthropology
entirely. Instead, his discussions expose elements of a negative dialectical anthropology.6
He  engages  with  the  tasks  and  predicaments  of  philosophical  anthropology,  and  he
accepts  a  minimum  of  positive  anthropological  assumptions  for  the  programme  of
Critical Theory – a concession that Adorno is not willing to make.
 
II. Adorno. The Verdict on First Nature
16 Adorno’s  Negative  Dialectics (1983:  124)  contains a radical  dismissal  of  anthropological
philosophy.  The  word  “man”  (Mensch),  he  writes,  is  a  synonym  for  existence  “in
demagogic  jargon.”  He  dismisses  anthropological  philosophy  as  a  whole,  including
versions restricted to the human being as it is. “We cannot say what man is. Man today is
a function, unfree, regressing behind whatever is ascribed to him as invariant […]. To
decipher the human essence by the way it is now would sabotage its possibility.” Even
anthropology’s attempt at turning indeterminacy into a primary principle – something
that  could  count  as  negative  anthropology’s  positive  element  –  falls  under  Adorno’s
verdict.  By  granting  man  his  coming  into  being  (Gewordensein)  and  conditionality  (
Bedingtheit)  as  abstract  qualities,  “historical  anthropology”7 ignores  man’s  actual
historical  condition – the “social  heritage of  the mutilations inflicted upon him over
Toward a Negative Anthropology
Anthropology & Materialism, 1 | 2013
4
thousands of years” as well as “the dehumanisation that has made the subjects what they
are” (ibid.; transl. changed). 
17 Adorno launches a coup de grâce against anthropological philosophy to push anthropology
even further into its “proper realms” of “positivist ethnology and sociological cultural
anthropology”  (Adorno  1970:  262-263;  own  translation).  In  its  process  of  retreat,
philosophical anthropology tried to survive by defining the human being as open and
essentially indefinable. “The thesis of new-fangled anthropology that man is open […] is
empty; it passes off its own indeterminacy […] as something determinate and positive.”8
Philosophy becomes apologetic in the moment it apprehends the individual as anything
but a disfigured expression of reified social relations. In Adorno’s eyes, anthropological
philosophy does not gain any legitimacy by conceding that man cannot be defined: “That
we cannot say what man is does not establish a particularly majestic anthropology; it
vetoes any anthropology” (Adorno 1983: 124; transl. changed).9
18 Contrary to his radical dismissal in the passages from Negative Dialectics, Adorno grants
“dialectical anthropology” an important role in his Lectures on Negative Dialectics. During
his discussion of the relationship between theory and praxis, he states that the question
why the proletarian revolution “did not and why it  could not  happen” belongs to “a
dialectical anthropology which is assuredly no small part of the problem of philosophy in
our time” (Adorno 2008: 46). A series of reflections from the 1940s, published under the
title “Individuum und Gesellschaft”, indicate what such a dialectical anthropology might
look like.10
19 Commenting on these fragments, Rolf Tiedemann supposes that Horkheimer and Adorno
never published a book based on this material because of the “general critique of any
non-historical anthropology that postulates a human essence as such, a critique that is
already presented in Horkheimer’s  ‘Remarks’  […].  While traditional  anthropology,  for
instance  Max  Scheler,  departs  from  unitary  basic  structures  of  the  human  being  (
Menschsein), a materialist anthropology, which could have been the only anthropology
pursuable by Critical Theory, would address the historically changeable human nature.
Except for the name, a materialist anthropology would have almost nothing in common
with traditional philosophical anthropology.”11
20 The object of materialist anthropology would be man’s historically changeable nature.
Horkheimer might be willing to subscribe to this definition, but would Adorno? Could he
reject  conditionality  and  development  as  abstract  qualities,  but  allow  for  man’s
changeability?  The  Kantian  restriction  of  empirical  realism  to  the  limits  of
transcendental idealism would refute the assumption of an invariant natural essence, but
the categories cannot be independent of social mediation. This implies that orthodox
materialism’s concept of nature as pre-existing and ineluctable does not apply to human
“nature”, but still supports the refutation of the human being’s transcendence.12 Based on
these stipulations, Adorno’s dialectical anthropology would conceive of nature as being
mediated by subjectivity, but reject the idea that the laws of this mediation are absolute.
Rather,  they  are  shaped  by  the  objective  development  of  social  conditions.  If  these
conditions change, our concept of nature changes too.
21 If there is no transcendence of man and his self-understanding, then the relationship
between history and nature can only be understood on the basis of a “secular category”
(Adorno  1983:  360).  Adorno  adopts  Benjamin’s  concept  of  “nature-history”  from the
Origin of German Tragic Drama – the idea, in his words, that “the moment in which nature
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and history become commensurable with each other is the moment of decay (Vergängnis)”
(ibid.: 359; transl. changed). With the help of this category, Adorno (1984: 111) intends to
“dialectically  overcome  the  usual  antithesis  of  nature  and  history.”  Les  extrêmes  se
touchent.  Like Adorno’s dialectical philosophy, dialectical anthropology has to increase
the  oscillation  of  the  oppositions  without  conflating  them  altogether;  it  has  to  “
comprehend historical being in its most extreme historical determinacy, where it is most historical,
as natural being,” and at the same time “comprehend nature as an [sic] historical being where it
seems to rest most deeply in itself as nature” (ibid.: 117; italics in the original). 
22 What Adorno tries to overcome is the same antithesis Marquard (1973: 138-144) describes
as the alternative of  philosophical  anthropology and philosophy of  history.  However,
Adorno does not explicate his understanding of dialectical anthropology, and he does not
address the way in which nature and history relate to each other within the concept of
man. The question of this relationship is the inheritance of Kant’s separation of man’s
empirical and noumenal registers. Adorno rejects all philosophical anthropology instead
of confronting the way in which it complicates the antithesis of nature and history. For
him, there is no proper object of theoretical anthropology, neither human essence nor its
historical openness and changeability.
 
III. Sonnemann. Permanent anthropological revolution
23 In the preface to Negative Dialectics, Adorno (1973: 11) calls it a coincidence dictated by the
subject  matter  that  his  friend  Ulrich  Sonnemann  was  working  on  a  book  with  the
strikingly similar title, Negative Anthropologie.13 In his short review of the book, Adorno
(1970:  263)  describes  it  as  being  permeated  by  the  “critical  processes”  that  caused
anthropology to withdraw from the philosophical aspirations it pursued during the 1910s
and 1920s. However, as Adorno also notes, Sonnemann’s main focus is not the tradition of
philosophical anthropology, but the relationship between Freud and Marx. 
24 Horkheimer’s essay from 1935 has started these critical processes. 35 years later, Adorno
(ibid.;  own  translations)  contends,  Sonnemann’s  book  resumes  the  “cancelled  and
fractured discussion of anthropology”. His contribution, according to Adorno, is to depict
psychoanalysis and Marxism – “the last two great conceptions that dealt with the concept
of man” – not as two complementary instruments that work together, but as two opposed
efforts that both failed because they could not come to terms with each other. They can
only  break  the  spell  of  anthropological  philosophy’s  “monistic  construction  from  a
principle”  by  mutually  “defetishising”  each  other.  Such  defetishisation,  according  to
Adorno, requires that psychoanalysis and historical materialism both abandon their
positive anthropological assumptions, and instead understand man on the basis of his
denial and absence.
25 For Sonnemann himself, the failure of Marxism and psychoanalysis is rooted in a single
modern  epistemological  misconception.  Instrumental  reason’s  cunning  and
uncompromising self-preservation is the Leitmotiv of his Negative Anthropologie.  Theory
and praxis have to reflect their mutual entwinement, or they will inevitably fail, which is
much more fatal for social praxis than for theory.14 Sonnemann (1969: 22) maintains that
“deficient anthropology” was responsible for the “failure of the Marxist revolutions even
where they were triumphant in the beginning.”15 Marx, whom Sonnemann (2011: 375)
subsumes under the category of  positive anthropology,  was  deceived by the image (
Modellbild) of man; he did not see that his “new man” depends on the image of the human
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being as it is given in the present historical condition. Since the new man cannot be
demonstrated in any concrete historical situation, and always assumes the shape of the
present’s  phantasies,  Sonnemann  (1969:  22)  concludes  that  the  “design  of  man’s
possibilities”  cannot  be  called  “anthropology  in  the  positive  sense  of  the  word”.
Consequently,  he defines  negative anthropology as  the “demonstration of  the logical
impossibility of any total theory (Totaltheorie) of man.”
26 In discussing, among others, Descartes, Kant, and Nicholas of Cusa, Sonnemann seeks to
cast doubt on the assumption that the human being is a legitimate object of scientific and
philosophical  inquiry.  His  main  preoccupation  is  that  from  the  perspective  of
anthropological  philosophy,  man  is  at  the  same  time the  creator  of  epistemological
criteria  and the  object  to  which these  criteria  are  applied.  Sonnemann (1987:  16)  is
convinced,  however,  that  the  conditions  of  object  experience,  or  “Objekterfahrung”,
cannot themselves be the object of knowledge. 
27 Sonnemann’s  conception  rests  on  the  premise  that  what  blocks  the  realisation  of
reasonable  social  circumstances  is  not  the  existing  corrupt  reality,  but  the  abstract
images of how these circumstances could or should look like.16 Every teleological model
emerges from historically determined forms of consciousness, unable to transcend the
limitations of the present. What Sonnemann (1969: 136-137) worries about is the paradox
that  man  is  both  the  object  and  subject  of  cognition.  In  this  circular  structure,  or
“Kreislauf”,  positive  anthropology  causes  what  he  calls  a  short  circuit,  an  infinite
regression that corrupts historical materialism and psychoanalysis, eventually causing
revolutionary practice to fail.
28 Although Negative Anthropologie is not a philosophical anthropology sui generis, it is more
programmatic than the rudiments of a dialectical anthropology found in Horkheimer and
Adorno. They agree that the human being is not something unfinished or inconclusive; it
is not an eligible object of theoretical philosophy at all. However, since it assumes this
status as long as modern epistemology forces man to inquire about the condition of his
self-knowledge,  negative  anthropology  must  work on disproving  its  efforts  of  giving
conclusive explanations.
29 Sonnemann believes the ban on philosophical anthropology can and has to be more than
normative. In his eyes, the assumption that man can achieve complete and conclusive
self-knowledge  is  a  logical  error  capable  of  proving  theoretical  anthropology’s
epistemological impossibility. He does not claim to have provided such a proof, but he
called  the  task  by  its  name,  and  he  intended  to  pave  the  road  for  a  “permanent
anthropological  revolution”  (Sonnemann  2011:  361).  “Human  beings”,  concludes  his
thesis, “cannot say what they are, because they become what they think” (1969: 324).
 
Conclusion
30 In his introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Michel Foucault
(2008)  comes to  the conclusion that  what  Kant  presents  as  an antinomy solvable  by
transcendental  philosophy is  actually  an aporia  in  the  centre  of  the  anthropological
question itself:  in respect  to the human being,  the empirical  and transcendental  can
never reach congruence. The theoretical striving for this congruence, Sonnemann (1969:
22-23) contends, originated in an epoch where reason did not yet despair of itself, and
this despair is a welcome progress. 
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31 The  more  reason’s  self-doubt  is  embraced,  the  more  carefully  the  anthropological
question can be approached. Since assumptions about the essence of man are an integral
part of the scientific outlook of modernity, they have to be criticised permanently. In
view of such a critical project, Horkheimer provides reasons for why the anthropological
question should not be answered on metaphysical grounds alone. If it wants to be of any
value for Critical Theory, philosophical anthropology has to be limited to studying the
way in which social relations engender and shape specific historical human conditions. 
32 Adorno,  allegedly more radical  than Horkheimer in this respect,  claims to refute the
legitimacy  of  theoretical  anthropology  as  such.  Like  Horkheimer,  Adorno gives  good
reasons  for  why  the  question  “What  is  man?”  should  not be  answered,  but  its
epistemological impossibility – the question whether or not it can be answered – remains
an  open  issue.  Adorno’s  negative  dialectics  aim to  overcome  the  antithesis  between
nature and history, but he does not consider this antithesis as an immanent question of
anthropology.
33 Sonnemann  realises  negative  anthropology  as  a  critical  programme  based  on  the
conviction  that  positive  anthropology  hinders  social  praxis.  He  seeks  to  mobilise
subjective spontaneity against any totalising theories of man. By leaving man’s condition
undetermined,  negative  anthropology  seeks  to  destroy  images  of  future  human
conditions that block the way to an alteration of the present. 
34 In many ways, the early Frankfurt School’s altercation with philosophical anthropology
unearths an implicit tension between Kant and Marx. What Marx (1982: 254; 739) calls
man’s “boundless drive for enrichment, or “absoluter Bereicherungstrieb”, is what Kant
(1963: 15) understands as the human being’s natural disposition, or “Naturanlage”: the
twofold urge to “associate with” and to “isolate […] from others”. For Kant, the principle
of  nature  is  antagonism  striving  towards  harmony,  not  harmony  threatened  by
antagonism. “The means employed by nature to bring about the development of all the capacities
of men is their anatagonism in society” – or, to use Kant’s formula: “unsocial sociability”
(ibid.).
35 For Horkheimer,  Adorno,  and Sonnemann,  the stipulation of  a  natural  disposition to
isolate oneself from others – to achieve, “propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and
avarice, […] a rank among his fellows” (ibid.) – results from confusing what is invariant in
man with what is learned and socially conditioned. Negative anthropology targets the
assumption’s root: the idea of natural human disposition. It deciphers man’s inclination
towards isolation as nothing more than the child’s unconscious internalisation of the
prevailing socio-economic order, rehearsed in the sandboxes of public schoolyards.
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ENDNOTES
1. A note on this essay’s terminology: In an encyclopedia article from 1958, Jürgen Habermas
(1973 :  89-90)  distinguishes  between  empirical  and  philosophical  anthropology.  Empirical
anthropology can be (1) biological anthropology, a branch of zoology that compares the human
being to other animals in physiological or morphological terms, or (2) ethnology, often equated
with anthropology in the Anglophone world, which studies the social and cultural life of ancient
and non-writing cultures. Philosophical anthropology, according to Habermas, designates either (1)
the  German  “philosophische  Anthropologie,”  a  more  or  less  unified  school  of  thought
represented  by,  among  others,  Max  Scheler,  Helmuth  Plessner,  and  Arnold  Gehlen, or  (2)  a
subfield  (but  not  a  discipline)  of  philosophy  located  somewhere  between  logic,  ethics,  and
metaphysics that integrates the results of biology, ethnology, sociology, psychology etc. in order
to determine (in metaphysical or naturalist terms) the “essence” or “nature” of the human being.
Schnädelbach (1984: 219-234) describes early 20th-century German philosophical anthropology as
a  response  to  philosophy’s  evolving  identity  crisis  after  1831.  Fischer  (2008)  systematically
examines  the  German  “philosophische  Anthropologie”  as  a  more  or  less  unified  “school  of
thought”. – The numerous usages of “man” and his corresponding “he” throughout this essay are
due to the subject matter; they are not meant to be discriminatory in terms of gender distinction
or otherwise. – I am grateful to Brandon Woolf, Shane Boyle and Abby Anderton for their patient
assistance with the translation of this essay,  and to Julia Jarcho for sharing her thoughts on
negativity and utopia.
2. In his Lectures on logic, Kant (1992: 538) lists four questions of philosophy in a cosmopolitan
sense:  “1.  What  can I  know? 2.  What  ought  I  to  do?  3.  What  may I  hope?  4.  What  is  man?
Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third, and anthropology
the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the
first three questions relate to the last one.” Both editions of the Critique of Pure Reason contain
only the first three of these questions.  By separating empirical psychology from 18th-century
metaphysics, Kant’s first Critique (A 848/B 876) inaugurated anthropology as a problem of and for
modern philosophy. For Kant, anthropology could not be part of theoretical philosophy, because
the  human  being  is  partially  an  empirical  phenomenon  of  which  no  a  priori  knowledge  is
possible.  Only  as  an  applied  science  can  philosophical  anthropology  acquire  “pragmatic
knowledge”  of  man’s  condition  by  observing  his  behaviour  and  by  interpreting  his  cultural
manifestations. Physiology can gain empirical knowledge about man’s biophysical constitution –
about  “what  nature makes  of  the  human  being”  –  and  pragmatic  anthropology  can  acquire
knowledge of  man as  applied practical  knowledge,  or  “Weltkenntnis”  (Kant  2007:  231).  Such
knowledge can serve as an application of moral philosophy. In his Lectures on ethics, Kant (1997:
42) defines practical philosophy as the science of what man should do, and anthropology as the
science of  what  man actually  does.  These two sciences  “are  closely  connected,  and morality
cannot exist without anthropology, for one must first know of the agent whether he is also in a
position to accomplish what it is required from him that he should do.” Kant splits the concept of
man. Its empirical reality can only be known on the basis of the pure concepts and principles
dictated  by  transcendental  logic.  At  the  same  time,  these  concepts  are  empty  without  the
intuitions provided by sensibility, and sensibility remains – apart from pure intuitions and, by
extension, pure mathematics – tied to man’s physiology: the senses. A priori knowledge about the
physiological grounds of human sensibility is, strictly speaking, impossible. In Kant’s programme
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of critical philosophy, anthropology has its function as applied philosophy, but “human essence”
cannot be known a priori. On Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, see Brandt (1999), Stark (2003) and
Foucault (2008).
3. Several  attempts  were  proposed  to  understand  the  historical  change  of  human  nature.
Marquard (1973: 138) argues that since the late 18th century, philosophy had to decide between
nature and history: Turning towards nature and the lifeworld, or “Lebenswelt”, implies turning
away from history and the realization of freedom – and vice versa. A turn towards the lifeworld
made philosophical anthropology possible; by turning away from philosophy of history it became
“fundamental.” Kamper’s (1973: 153) “anthropological difference” describes the impossibility of
man’s conceptual fixation. Kofler’s (1973: 21; 1967: 23-36) “formal anthropology”, defined as the
“doctrine of the unchangeable preconditions of human changeability”, is closest to Marx’s early
understanding of labour as the metabolism of nature and humanity (Schmidt 1962: 63-78). The
metabolism itself is necessary and invariant, but its form changes significantly over the course of
history. 
4. In History and Class Consciousness,  Georg Lukács (1971: 186-187) dismisses anthropology as a
philosophical discipline because it reifies the human being’s historical possibilities. By “turning
philosophy into ‘anthropology’, he [Ludwig Feuerbach, DJ] caused man to become frozen in a
fixed  objectivity  […].  And  precisely  this  is  the  great  danger  of  every  ‘humanism’  or
anthropological point of view.”
5. Ernst Fromm’s and Herbert Marcuse’s attempts to combine Marx and Freud raise more specific
questions about the relationship between psychology and anthropology that point beyond the
scope  of  this  essay.  Walter  Benjamin’s  thought  also  relates  differently  to  the  philosophical
anthropology of  his  time.  Although he shares  many premises  with Horhkeimer,  Adorno and
Sonneman,  his  work  contains  a  highly  idiosyncratic  notion  of  anthropology  that  cannot  be
described in the same way as negative anthropology.
6. Martin Jay (1973: 56) points towards these elements when he writes, “in Horkheimer’s work
there appeared a kind of negative anthropology, an implicit but still powerful presence.”
7. Adorno’s  use  of  the  term “historische  Anthropologie”  seems to  refer  to  later  versions of
philosophical  anthropology  that  no  longer  insist  on  an  undeviating  human  nature,  but  still
depart  from primary  assumptions  about  the  essence  of  man in  order  to  construct  coherent
theories. This historical anthropology is not to be confused with the Historische Anthropologie of
the 1980s and 1990s. Examples of this approach can be found in Gebauer et al. (1989).
8. My own translation. “Die These arrivierter Anthropologie, der Mensch sei offen – selten fehlt
ihr der hämische Seitenblick aufs Tier –, ist leer; sie gaukelt ihre eigene Unbestimmtheit, ihr
Fallissement, als Bestimmtes und Positives vor“ (Adorno 1973: 130). Here, Adorno might think of
Plessner’s (1981: 188) “relation of indeterminacy”: “In dieser Relation der Unbestimmtheit zu
sich faßt sich der Mensch als Macht und entdeckt sich für sein Leben, theoretisch und praktisch,
als offene Frage.”
9. In  Minima  Moralia (2005:  167),  Adorno  evokes  the  notion  “negative  anthropology”  as  a
description of  what  the human beings  are  deprived of  by society.  Referring to  this  passage,
Breuer  (1985:  34)  reads  Adorno’s  negative  anthropology  as  the  centrepiece  of  his  negative
dialectics. Since modern society has subdued and domesticated “first nature” to an extent, that
theory can disregard it (35), negative anthropology has to turn to second nature. It consequently
becomes  a  paradox:  anthropology  without  anthropos (50).  Although  it  is  true  that  Adorno
disregards any notion of first nature prior to social and conceptual mediation – “Second nature,
in truth, is first nature”, he wrote as early as 1932 (Adorno 1984: 124) – his veto from Negative
Dialectics would apply again: Anthropology without anthropos would be no special anthropology,
but the mark of its impossibility. However, Breuer correctly points out that Adorno’s verdict is
not as exclusive as it seems. 
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10. These fragments were presumably written in close proximity to the reflections gathered in
the last chapter of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, described by Horkheimer and Adorno (2001: xix)
as pertaining to a “dialectical anthropology”.
11. My own translation. “Daß es gleichwohl zu keiner abgeschlossenen, dem Druck übergebenen
Arbeit  […]  gekommen  ist,  dürfte  mit  der  prinzipiellen  Kritik  aller  außergeschichtlichen
Anthropologie  zusammenhängen,  wie  sie  bereits  in  Horkheimers  Bemerkungen  zur
philosophischen  Anthropologie  von  1935  vorgetragen  wird.  Während  die  traditionelle
Anthropologie  etwa  bei  Max  Scheler  von  einheitlichen  Grundstrukturen  des  ‚Menschseins’
ausgeht, hätte eine materialistische Anthropologie, um die allein es der Kritischen Theorie zu tun
sein  konnte,  von  der  historisch  sich  ändernden  Natur  des  Menschen  zu  handeln.  Die
materialistische Anthropologie hätte mit der traditionellen philosophischen den Namen, sonst
kaum noch etwas gemeinsam” (Adorno 2003a: 60).
12. “Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human
beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and
the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own
essence” (Engels 1997: 190). 
13. Sonnemann’s Negative Anthropologie has not been translated into English. For an introduction
to  Sonnemann’s  thought,  see  Schmied-Kowarzik  (1999).  For  bibliographical  and  biographical
information,  see  Schmied-Kowarzik  (1992).  The  small  paragraph  that  contains  Adorno’s
reference to Sonnemann’s book is missing in Ashton’s translation of Negative Dialectic. 
14. Adorno’s  “Marginalia  to  Theory  and  Praxis”,  one  of  his  last  writings,  is  dedicated  to
Sonnemann, and his remarks on dialectical anthropology in the Lectures on Negative Dialectics,
mentioned above, also seem to be written with a side glance to his friend’s work.
15. All translations from Negative Anthropologie are my own.
16. Adorno expresses the same thought at the end of his Lectures on Negative Dialectics (2008:
181-182):  “Knowledge, which desires content,  is really in search of utopia. It  [utopia,  DJ],  the
consciousness of possibility, clings to whatever has not been disfigured. The way to utopia is
barred by the possible, never the immediate reality; this is why it always appears abstract to
consciousness [im Bewusstsein].” Transl. changed. German original: “Erkenntnis, die den Inhalt
will, meint die Utopie. […] Sie, das Bewußtsein der Möglichkeit, haftet an dem Unverschandelten.
Es  ist  das  Mögliche,  niemals  das  unmittelbar  Wirkliche,  das  ihm den Platz  versperrt;  darum
erscheint es im Bewußtsein immer als abstract” (Adorno 2007: 224). 
ABSTRACTS
Can philosophy say what man is? What is gained or lost by making theoretical assumptions about
the human being? This essay examines the “negative anthropology” of the early Frankfurt School
by asking how Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno and Ulrich Sonnemann engage with the
question  “What  is  man?”  Negative  anthropology  turns  out  to  be  more  than  the  critique  of
philosophical anthropology: By understanding the human being as the ensemble of what it is not,
negative anthropology avoids the predicament of spelling out what it could be, while holding on
to the idea of man’s self-realization in history. What role does negative anthropology play as a
component of critical social theory? To what extent can it count as a theoretical programme? Do
certain historical situations demand anthropological assumptions more than others? To address
these questions, this essay follows the early Frankfurt School’s altercations with anthropological
philosophy.
La philosophie peut-elle définir l’essence de l’homme ? Que gagne-t-on – ou perd-on – avec des
déclarations métaphysiques sur l’être humain ? Cet essai explore l’ « anthropologie négative » de
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la  première école  de Francfort  à  travers  les  réponses de Walter  Benjamin,  Max Horkheimer,
Theodor  W.  Adorno  et  Ulrich  Sonnemann  à  la  question :  « qu’est-ce  que  l’homme » ?
L’anthropologie  négative  apparaît  alors  comme  plus  qu’une  critique  de  l’anthropologie
philosophique. En appréhendant l’homme à travers tout ce qu’il n’est pas, elle évite la situation
fâcheuse d’énoncer ce qu’il  pourrait être,  tout en préservant l’idée d’émancipation. Quel rôle
l’anthropologie négative joue-t-elle en tant que composante d’une théorie sociale critique ? A
quel  point  compte-t-elle  dans  son  programme  théorique ?  Certaines  situations  historiques
exigent-elles des énoncés anthropologiques plus que d’autres ? L’artice présent discute de ces
questions en circonscrivant  le  conflit  de la  première Ecole  de Francfort  avec l’anthropologie
philosophique.
¿Puede  acaso  la  filosofía  determinar  la  esencia  del  hombre ?  ¿Qué  se  gana  o  qué  se  pierde
asumiendo  determinaciones  metafísicas  sobre  el  ser  humano ?  Este  ensayo  examina  la
« antropología negativa » de la primera escuela de Frankfurt indagando el modo en que Walter
Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno y Ulrich Sonnemann responden a la pregunta
« ¿qué es el hombre? ». La antropología negativa aparece entonces como algo más que la crítica
de la filosofía antropológica. Al comprender al hombre a partir de todo de lo que él no es, la
antropología negativa evita la difícil situación de detallar lo que él podría ser, manteniendo al
mismo  tiempo  la  idea  de  emancipación.  ¿Qué  rol  juega  la  antropología  negativa  en  tanto
componente de la teoría social crítica? ¿Hasta qué punto puede contar como programa teorético?
¿Acaso ciertas situaciones históricas exigen asumir supuestos antropológicos más que otras? Este
ensayo discute tales interrogantes siguiendo el conflicto de la primera escuela de Frankfurt con
la antropología filosófica.
INDEX
Keywords: critical theory, Frankfurt school, philosophical anthropology, negative anthropology,
materialism, Sonnemann Ulrich
Palabras claves: teoría crítica, escuela de Frankfurt, materialismo antropológico, antropología
negativa, materialismo
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